MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE: Good afternoon.

We have been very active in explaining our actions in Iraq and securing support around the world for the military campaign now under way.

In the last 24 hours, our ambassadors around the world have personally engaged host governments in clarifying our reasons for resorting to military force.

In Washington, we are briefing every foreign mission on the reasons we've undertaken this action. And since yesterday, I have personally contacted over 20 foreign leaders and the secretary-general of the United Nations to discuss the situation. And the response has been gratifying.

In my calls to the Arab leaders, I found a full understanding of why we have undertaken military action. Most expressed the view that Saddam Hussein is entirely responsible for the military strike now under way due to his refusal to take advantage of the final chance offered him in November to begin full and unconditional cooperation with the United Nations weapons inspectors.

They also understand that we have given diplomacy every possible chance to work. They know we have resorted to this action because Saddam Hussein has left us no other choice. Like us, they are concerned for the welfare of the Iraqi people. They, too, strongly support the massive United Nations humanitarian program in Iraq, of which the United States was one of the chief authors.

They know that we are exercising every effort to avoid civilian casualties in this operation.

There have been a few critical public comments, but the reaction so far serves to underscore how isolated Saddam is in the Arab world.

Among our allies, we have been pleased by the strong expressions of support we have received from Canada and the EU, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

They point out that Saddam Hussein bears the responsibility for the military action now under way as a result of his defiance of the Security Council and his obstinate refusal to honor his obligations under binding Security Council resolutions.

Among members of the Security Council, we have encountered some expressions of regret that a peaceful solution couldn't be found despite all our best efforts. And there is also a general sense that the behavior of Saddam Hussein has brought us to this pass. This is the French position.

The Russians and Chinese are critical, of course, but over the past year they have failed to provide any viable alternative.

Our efforts to build support for the joint U.S.-U.K. action in Iraq will continue, but one thing is clear: The international community is firm in its determination that the way forward is for Iraq to comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

The actions of Saddam Hussein himself have led us to the point we are at today.

And I'll now be happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, does the lack of unanimity hurt the U.S. cause in any measurable way? And, you know, I must say, these anonymous references, but I must say, comparisons are being made to the Gulf coalition in '91, suggesting that the Bush administration got more Arabs on board visibly and got the French on board. And, you know, that raises the question whether this, what looks like mostly an Anglo-American, mission can be as successful.

ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me say I do think that we are being successful in terms of our goals here. But I also think we've had this discussion before. The situation in '91 was quite different.

What you had was a cross-border aggression and something that was very visible and aggression into an Arab country.

And also, as you remember, it took a long time to put the coalition together. One of the problems that we have had is that the sanctions regime has been in place a long time. And as I've described to you a number of times, basically, we have held on to the Security Council coalition to keep the sanctions in place; and as you know, there are these regular reviews.

And while there's a lot of discussion during them, there never has been a decision to end the sanctions. We are now dealing with a threat, I think, that is probably harder for some to understand because it is a threat of the future rather a present threat where there -- or a present act, such as a border crossing -- a border aggression.

And here, as the president described in the statement yesterday, we are concerned about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's ability to have, develop, deploy weapons of mass destruction and the threat that that poses to the neighbors, to the stability of the Middle East and therefore, ultimately, to ourselves. So it's a different -- it's the same country, but a different situation.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, looking down the road toward a possible end to this crisis, supposing Saddam Hussein does write another letter saying he would agree to cooperate fully without exception, why would you believe him, given his track record?

ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, it would be hard to believe him, I must say. I think that again it would be -- we would have to get proof of his cooperation. And let me say that this military campaign is going to continue.

We are sensitive to the beginnings of Ramadan, but this campaign will continue to its completion. And Saddam Hussein can in fact say that he will let UNSCOM back in, a functioning UNSCOM, and he can cooperate, and again, the proof will be as to whether he does cooperate with them.

But we will not stand for an UNSCOM that is not fully capable of doing its work. I think that one of the things we have to remember is that UNSCOM has not been able to do its work for the last eight months. So we would have to have an UNSCOM that is able to function under strong leadership.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, were you at all surprised at the tone of the Russian remarks in the security conference? They seemed much harsher than they have been for some time.

ALBRIGHT: Well, I think I wasn't surprised because I've had a number of conversations with Foreign Minister Ivanov. I think that they have tried to find some way to persuade Saddam Hussein to live up to his obligations. The interesting part is they do not deny the fact that he has to live up to his obligations, and they have in the past tried to persuade him and sent a variety of envoys, and tried to make it work.

I would say that they're disappointed in the fact that they have not been able to make it work. They have no better solutions. And while I regret their attack on Chairman Butler, it's like as I've said, they are trying to shoot the messenger here.

The fault and the problem here is Saddam Hussein. There is no other problem here, beyond the fact of Saddam Hussein's noncompliance. The Russian relationship is one that we consider very important, and we will cooperate where we can on a whole host of issues.

And we will manage our disagreements where we must. And I have, as I said, I had a number of conversations with Foreign Minister Ivanov yesterday. I haven't talked to him yet today, but I probably will. And I think that they are very frustrated with the fact that they have been unable to persuade Saddam Hussein to live up to his obligations.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) I'm trying to understand the sort of larger strategy, because on the one hand, you know, we say we want Iraq to comply fully with all relevant U.N. resolutions, which would have to include UNSCOM in order to get sanctions lifted. On the other hand, we say actually we want regime change. We want Saddam Hussein out; that's the real goal, and we don't believe UNSCOM will ever be allowed back in in a functioning way. Can you try to square the circle for us please?

ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think there are kind of longer-, medium- and shorter-term goals here. Obviously, the goal is at this, the short-term goal at the moment, through this military campaign, is to degrade his ability to develop and deploy his weapons of mass destruction; to look at -- to degrade his command and control in some of his security areas so that he -- in order to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors. That is the short-term goal of what we are doing.

A medium-term goal is in fact to have him comply with the Security Council resolutions, and I believe that he can't have two contradictory things, which is to have sanctions lifted and retain his weapons of mass destruction.

So, the medium-term goal is to -- he's the one who we can't square that circle. And the only way here is for UNSCOM, a strong, professional, functioning UNSCOM with unfettered access to be able to continue to do its work and again, parentheses here, just keep in mind that it has not been able to do that.

So if we can get a functioning UNSCOM back in, that is a plus, and we will continue our policy of containment of Saddam through the economic embargo and generally in terms of keeping him in his box.

Longer term, we have come to the determination that the Iraqi people would benefit if they had a government that really represented them.

And so we know that this is something that cannot be done overnight, and we are working with the various opposition groups on a longer-range way of trying to help them help themselves to have a regime that represents them.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, some of us had a meeting with Senator Biden this morning, and he was commenting on the fact that in all the years he's been in Washington, he couldn't remember a controversial foreign policy or national security action in which members of Congress sharply criticized the president even on a decision they agreed with. There were plenty of occasions, such as the invasion of Cambodia, where they disagreed with the basic decision. What does that tell us now about the conduct of foreign policy?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I have spoken a lot about the importance of having bipartisan support for foreign policy and the fact that that is the best kind of foreign policy when you're able to get that kind of support.

And the truth is that there has been bipartisan support for this action.

We've had -- there have been some very strong statements by Chairman Helms and Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel and Senator McCain, to mention a few, and Senator Warner, some Republicans. Some support on the House side -- I spoke with Chairman Gilman. He said he was supportive.

I saw Congressman Buyer last night on -- on television saying that he was supportive, so there has been bipartisan support. It is not complete support, obviously.

And I think that one would hope very much that there would be support for the president's action and for our troops. I think that is very important. But I do believe that some of the kind of rules of the game that had existed for so long about criticism when the president's out of the country, and various kinds of stopping of criticism at the water's edge, I wish that those kind of came back into style.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) Senator Biden this morning was saying he thought that really anybody would be better in a leadership position in Iraq than Saddam Hussein. Do you agree? And is this really the aim of U.S. policy, just to replace him, to oust him?

ALBRIGHT: Well, it's very hard to imagine anybody worse. I think that he is somebody who has no respect for his own people. There are not a lot of leaders in the world who have used chemical weapons against their own people. And I will not make the obvious comparison. But I think that he is someone who has aggressive designs on his region, and he is somebody who has total disregard for the will of the international community.

So it's very hard to imagine somebody worse.

And I do think that there are -- you know, there's been a lot of discussion about the Iraqi people, and who cares about them and how they suffer.

QUESTION: Would you please comment on the question -- parliament's decision, statement, that this action -- this act could make it more difficult to ratify START II?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that I have heard that, but the truth is that the only reason that the Russians would ratify START II is it's in their national interest. And there have also been statements by various Russian leaders who are concerned about the fact that if START II is not ratified, then they will have to use scarce defense funds for the problem of maintaining missiles that they don't need, rather than on some of their other force needs.

So we hope very much that the ratification of START II will go forward, because it's in our national interest and because it's in Russia's national interest. Otherwise, they wouldn't have signed on.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, on a related question, can you comment on temporary closures of U.S. embassies in Africa, and whether it's related in any way to action -- to the action in Iraq?

ALBRIGHT: We have temporarily closed our embassies and done some ordered departures in Kuwait and in Israel because we are concerned about general threats and the heightened situation.

Yes?

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) Yes, Madam Secretary, the support that you say you are hearing from the foreign leaders you speak to, who are also expressing concern for the Iraqi people, do they say that they are basing their support in the belief that your strategy will bring relief to the Iraqi people -- your strategy, your short-, medium- and long-term strategy for Iraq?

ALBRIGHT: I think that they -- that isn't quite the way the question has worked. But let me do something first and explain. I have tried, being a professor, to group my answers in some kind of a way as to how these polls have gone. And I think they're kind of in four groups.

The first is of those who are strongly supportive of what we have done, the list I have read. And I think in addition to that list there's also Denmark and Norway. And there are those who are strongly supportive of what we're doing.

Then there are the Arab countries who are supportive and are giving us the support that we need to carry on this mission. And they are the ones, I think, that are primarily voicing the problems of the Iraqi people.

I think the others have mentioned it. But clearly, it's the Arab countries that are the most concerned about it.

The third group are those who, I would say the kind of key word for their comments is they regret this. And they regret it because Saddam Hussein led us into this situation. Oh, and let me just say back on the Arabs, they also are very clear about the fact that it was Saddam Hussein's responsibility that this happened, as they made clear in their GCC statement, and as they have repeated to me on the phone.

But the regret group are basically regretful of the fact that we have come to this and that a diplomatic solution has not been found.

And then there's the fourth group, which are really the Russians and the Chinese.

So, but the main concern about the Iraqi people I think clearly come from the Arab group.

And I think that I would read into what they're saying is that basically they are concerned about civilian casualties. And I've told them that we are doing everything we can to avoid that. But they are concerned about the long-term situation of the Iraqi people, and I've talked about the fact that the oil-for-food program needs to be in place, and that we think -- and they agree -- that some other form of government, some other leader, would be of help to the Iraqi people.

These are general discussions only.

QUESTION: Could I just follow up?

And they -- they support this long-term strategy?

ALBRIGHT: I -- It depends, frankly. There are some -- I think it's inappropriate for me to really go into it.

(UNKNOWN): Last question.

QUESTION: In your discussion with Arab leaders, have you found that they would regard continuing bombing during Ramadan as less offensive than initiating bombing during Ramadan?

ALBRIGHT: Specifically, we have not talked about that. And I have -- but I have expressed the fact that we are sensitive to the fact that Ramadan is going -- is about to be upon us.

But frankly, they have not talked about it. I am the one that has initiated the fact that -- just the way that the president did in his statement -- that we are sensitive to Ramadan.

(UNKNOWN): Thank you very much.

ALBRIGHT: Thank you.